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I. INTRODUCTION
The income tax system which has served the United States well for
over eight decades is under increasing attack from politicians, econo-
mists, business leaders, and tax academicians. Although the system
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arguably collects more money than any other tax system in the world
and does so at the lowest cost of any system in the world,1 numerous
members of Congress and various other commentators argue that a radi-
cal overhaul of the system is required and that the system needs to be
"torn out by its roots" and replaced by a national sales tax or other con-
sumption-based tax system. The U.S. international tax rules have come
under particularly strong attack, including assertions that these rules are
interfering with the ability of U.S. multinational corporations to compete
in the global economy and contributing to the continuing U.S. trade
deficit.
Despite this overblown rhetoric, both fairness and administrative
feasibility dictate that an income tax system will and should be retained
as the primary tax base in the United States for the foreseeable future.2
In my view, the prudent path to U.S. tax reform is to substantially
improve the current income tax system by broadening the base and low-
ering rates, before embarking on a radical replacement of the current
system with an unproven consumption tax.3 This paper provides sug-
gestions for the reform of certain areas of the U.S. international income
tax rules under the assumption that the United States will retain an
income tax system as its primary tax base.
1. See, e.g., N. JEROLD CoHEN, Remark at the College of William and Mary's Annual Tax
Conference (Dec. 6-7, 1996), in TAx ANALYSTS' DAILY TAX HIGHLIHTS & DocuMENTs, Dec.
18, 1996, at 2942.
2. Obviously, given tight page limits for this paper, I cannot rehash the arguments for and
against an income tax versus a consumption tax. As an aside, I believe that enactment of a
consumption tax as a supplement to the income tax system is desirable and politically feasible.
The revenue from such a consumption tax could be used to accomplish a number of desirable tax
policy objectives, including reform and simplification of the income tax, full or partial corporate
integration, and repeal of the regressive and ever-increasing payroll taxes. Moreover, adoption of
a consumption tax as a supplement to, rather than replacement for, the income tax would allow
U.S. policymakers to analyze how much revenue the consumption tax raises, the costs of
implementing the tax for both taxpayers and the government, the distribution of the tax among
different income levels, and the economic and social effects of the tax. The results of that study
could then be used as the basis for gradual expansion of the role of the consumption tax and
concomitant reduction of the role of the income tax as a revenue raising device if we decide that
this is the appropriate policy move.
Additionally, I recognize that our current income tax system is really a hybrid, containing
some elements that are closer to a consumption-based approach than to an income-based approach
(e.g., the qualified pension plan provisions), and that further incremental shifts toward a
consumption-based approach are likely to occur even if we retain an income tax as the principal
tax base.
3. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The International Implications of Tax Reform, 69
TAX NoTEs 913 (1995) (discussing how adoption of any of the major consumption tax proposals
currently on the table in Congress (e.g., the Archer-Lugar national sales tax proposal, the Armey-
Shelby flat tax proposal, or the Nunn-Domenici graduated consumption tax proposal) would likely
have a serious destabilizing effect on the international tax regime and could lead to unrestricted
tax competition between the United States and other countries throughout the world).
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II. OVERVIEW
The current U.S. international tax system reflects the exercise of
two types of taxing jurisdiction that are consistent with international tax
norms, residence-based and source-based jurisdiction. In the case of
U.S. persons (e.g., U.S. citizens, resident aliens, and domestic corpora-
tions), the United States exercises residence-based taxing jurisdiction
and taxes such persons on their worldwide incomes. However, in the
case of foreign source income, the United States cedes primary jurisdic-
tion to the country of source and allows U.S. persons a foreign tax credit
for the foreign income taxes paid on such income, thereby preventing
international double taxation. In effect, the United States imposes only a
residual tax on U.S. persons' foreign source income. However, pursuant
to bilateral tax treaties entered into by the United States with various
countries, the foreign treaty country eliminates, or substantially reduces,
its tax on U.S. persons' portfolio income, such as interest and dividends,
and eliminates its tax on business profits not attributable to a permanent
establishment in the treaty country. The primary taxing jurisdiction over
such income is thus ceded to the United States, the country of residence.
Generally, the U.S. rules for taxing the international income of U.S.
persons reflect capital export neutrality. Under this capital export neu-
trality theory, U.S. persons pay the same total tax (U.S. and foreign tax)
on all income, regardless of whether the income is earned in the United
States or abroad. Therefore, the decision to invest in the United States
or abroad is not made on the basis of tax considerations; instead, the
investment is made wherever the pretax economic returns are greatest.4
Although the general preference in the U.S. tax system is for taxing
U.S. persons on a residence basis and implementing capital export neu-
trality, significant departures from these principles exist. First, as a gen-
eral rule, the United States still adheres to the deferral principle with
respect to foreign source income earned by U.S. persons through foreign
corporations, i.e., the U.S. shareholders are not taxed on their shares of
the foreign corporation's foreign source income until that income is dis-
tributed to them or the U.S. shareholders sell their stock in the foreign
corporation. This deferral principle is subject to a complex array of anti-
deferral regimes that focus primarily on easily movable and low-taxed
passive income, as well as certain tainted, tax-haven transactions. As
discussed below, this deferral principle and its exceptions undermine the
equity, efficiency, and simplicity of the tax system.
Second, the United States does not follow pure capital export neu-
4. See, e.g., C A.Lms H. GUSTAPSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH,
TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 17 (1997).
1997]
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trality in the design of its foreign tax credit. Under pure capital export
neutrality, a credit would be allowed for foreign taxes in excess of the
U.S. rate, which would allow the foreign tax credit to offset U.S. taxes
on U.S. source income. However, such an approach would enable for-
eign countries to erode U.S. taxing jurisdiction over U.S. source income
and would amount to a U.S. subsidy of high-tax foreign countries. This
approach would also allow foreign countries to maintain income tax
rates above the U.S. rate without suffering the consequences of reduced
investment by U.S. persons and would encourage foreign countries to
impose discriminatorily higher taxes on U.S. persons.5 Thus, since
1921, the United States has imposed an overall limit on the foreign tax
credit. This limitation prevents the credit from offsetting U.S. taxes on
U.S. source income.
An overall limit on the foreign tax credit, however, still permits
U.S. persons to credit high foreign taxes in excess of the U.S. rate on
one type of foreign source income against the U.S. tax on low-taxed or
untaxed foreign source income. Consequently, this overall limit creates
an incentive for U.S. persons with high-taxed foreign source income,
usually from business operations in a foreign country, to move some of
their other investment capital and business operations to low-tax foreign
jurisdictions (instead of keeping the capital or business operations in the
United States) in order to take advantage of these cross-crediting oppor-
tunities. Accordingly, between 1932 and 1976, a per-country foreign tax
credit limit was used, either alone or in combination with an overall
limit, which limited the credit to the U.S. tax on foreign source income
on a country-by-country basis. Since repeal of the per-country limit, the
United States has created a series of separate limits, currently set forth in
section 904(d), sometimes called "basket limits," which apply the over-
all limit separately to certain categories of foreign source income.
These basket limits have added significant complexity to the tax system;
yet, by retaining a general basket limit into which most foreign business
income falls, they still have not solved the problem of preventing U.S.
persons from cross-crediting high foreign taxes on foreign business
income in excess of the U.S. rate against the U.S. tax on low-taxed for-
eign business income.
Third, the U.S. tax system contains a number of provisions favoring
certain types of foreign source income of U.S. persons and other provi-
sions disfavoring foreign business and investment activity. For exam-
5. See, e.g., Daniel J. Frisch, The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and
New Approaches, 47 TAx NoTs 581, 583 (1990); Charles I. Kingson, The Foreign Tax Credit
and Its Critics, 9 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1, 56 (1991) [hereinafter Kingson, The Foreign Tax Credit].
6. See I.R.C. § 904 (1996).
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pie, the FSC provisions and the title-passage rule for inventory property
provide a tax subsidy for certain export activities of U.S. taxpayers. The
foreign earned income exclusion in section 911 provides a tax subsidy
for U.S. individual taxpayers who live and work abroad.7 On the other
hand, section 168(g)(1)(A) forces U.S. taxpayers to use a less advanta-
geous cost recovery system for depreciable property used predominantly
abroad,8 thus providing a tax disincentive to foreign business invest-
ment. Moreover, Congress uses various tax penalty provisions to penal-
ize foreign economic activities that it believes violate certain U.S.
foreign policy objectives.
The U.S. taxation of foreign persons (e.g., nonresident aliens and
foreign corporations) is more limited than that of U.S. persons. The
United States exercises source-based taxing jurisdiction and imposes
income tax only on certain types of U.S. source income realized by such
persons, including U.S. source portfolio income such as interest, divi-
dends, rent, and royalties, income from a U.S. trade or business, and
gains from the sale of U.S. real property interests. The United States
also taxes certain types of foreign source income of a foreign person if
the income has a close connection to a U.S. trade or business. However,
pursuant to bilateral tax treaties or, in some cases, unilaterally by statute,
the United States often eliminates or reduces the U.S. tax on foreign
persons' portfolio income such as interest, dividends, and royalties, and
also eliminates the U.S. tax on foreign persons' business profits not
attributable to a permanent establishment in the United States. Thus, the
primary taxing jurisdiction over such income is ceded to the foreign
country of residence. Moreover, with certain exceptions, foreign per-
sons are generally not subject to U.S. tax on capital gains.'
The U.S. rules for taxing foreign persons generally reflect interna-
tional norms and represent an appropriate exercise of source-based tax-
ing jurisdiction. Although these provisions certainly need
simplification, refinement, clarification, and modernization, given page
and time constraints, that topic is not within the scope of this paper.10
7. See I.R.C. § 911 (1996).
8. See I.R.C. § 168(g)(l)(A) (1996).
9. The exceptions principally include gains from the sale of U.S. real property interests and
capital gains effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business.
10. These constraints also limit the depth with which I can present my analysis of reform of
the U.S. international tax rules relating to U.S. persons.
For recent commentary on reforming the U.S. international tax rules relating to foreign
persons, see generally AMERICAN LAW INsTrrTUE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT:
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION-PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES
TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND OF Tie FOREIGN INCOME OF UNITED STATES PERSONS (1987)
[hereinafter ALI INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY]; Yoseph M. Edrey, Taxation of International
Activity: FDAP, ECI and the Dual Capacity of an Employee as a Taxpayer, 15 VA. TAX Rav. 653
1997]
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This paper will focus on certain key aspects of the U.S. rules for taxing
the international activities of U.S. persons.
III. THE PROPER PATH TO INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM:
REINFORCEMENT OF RESIDENCE-BASED
TAXATION OF U.S. PERSONS
A. Introduction
In recent years, many business leaders, politicians, and commenta-
tors have taken the position that international tax policy should be driven
by concerns about the competitiveness of U.S. multinational corpora-
tions in the global economy. These commentators maintain that the U.S.
international tax system should be revised to implement capital import
neutrality at least with respect to the taxation of active business income
earned by U.S. multinationals abroad." Capital import neutrality
focuses on taxation in the host country; all firms operating in the same
industry in a particular country bear the same level of tax.' 2 Under this
view, source-based taxation of active business income should be the
norm and the residence country should adopt a territorial system of
international taxation that would exempt foreign source business income
of its multinationals from domestic taxation. 13
This paper, however, explores and supports a contrary view. It
assumes that residence-based taxing jurisdiction of U.S. persons' foreign
source income is appropriate and that capital export neutrality should
continue to be the main neutrality principle underlying the international
tax rules of the United States. Consistent with these assumptions, the
(1996); John S. Nolan, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment in the United States, 8 AM. J.
TAX POL'Y 291 (1990); H. David Rosenbloom, Toward a New Tax Treaty Policy For a New
Decade, 9 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 77 (1991).
11. See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME:
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 57-60 (1992).
12. See, e.g., GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 4, at 17.
13. Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah also argues for such an approach on the basis that it would
substantially simplify the U.S. international tax system, rather than on capital import neutrality
grounds. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for
Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1301 (1996) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Proposal for
Simplification]. However, in a more recent article, Professor Avi-Yonah seems to take a different
approach and recognize that, in the light of the adoption of the check-the-box entity classification
system, repeal of deferral of foreign source income of U.S. multinationals may be the appropriate
way to simplify the U.S. international tax rules. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, To End Deferral As We
Know It: Simplification Potential of Check-the-Box, 74 TAX NoTEs 219 (1996) [hereinafter Avi-
Yonah, Simplification Potential of Check-the-Box].
For a provocative commentary arguing that both efficiency and equity principles support a
territorial system of taxation, see Klaus Vogel, World-wide vs. Source Taxation of Income-A
Review and Reevaluation of Arguments, in I FLUENCE OF TAX DIFFERENTIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
CoMPETrrvEmEss 117 (1990).
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United States should not adopt a territorial system for taxing interna-
tional income. The way to reform the international tax rules is to bring
the current system closer to a capital export neutrality ideal by making
the following changes: repealing deferral with respect to all foreign
income earned by U.S. shareholders through controlled foreign corpora-
tions and by any U.S. investors through passive foreign investment com-
panies;" reforming and simplifying the foreign tax credit limit; adopting
the worldwide fungibility approach for allocating and apportioning inter-
est expense; repealing the inefficient export incentives in the Code such
as the FSC provisions and the title-passage source rule for income from
inventory sales; and repealing the foreign earned income exclusion in
section 911. These changes would simplify the U.S. international tax
rules and, more importantly, result in a U.S. international tax system that
is more theoretically coherent and that better promotes economic
efficiency.
B. Reasons for Favoring Residence-Based Taxation and Rejecting
the Adoption of a Territorial System
A territorial system is fundamentally inconsistent with the prevail-
ing concepts of fairness that underlie our income tax system. One of
those key concepts is the notion of horizontal equity, i.e., that income
taxes should be based bn some measure of a taxpayer's ability to pay
and that income tax liability should not vary based on the source of
income. A residence-based system for taxing U.S. persons, which taxes
a U.S. person on its worldwide income but allows a credit for foreign
income taxes paid, is consistent with this principle because a U.S. person
pays the same total income tax regardless of where the income is
derived.' 5 As stated by Hugh Ault and David Bradford: "[S]ince the
source of income has no bearing on its validity as a measure of ability to
14. For recent commentary calling for an end to deferral, see Avi-Yonah, Simplification
Potential of Check-the-Box, supra note 13; Asim Bhansali, Note, Globalizing Consolidated
Taxation of United States Multinationals, 74 TEx. L. Rav. 1401 (1996); Robert A. Green, The
Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CoRi.NEL L. REV.
18 (1993); Joseph Isenbergh, Perspectives on the Deferral of U.S. Taxation of the Earnings of
Foreign Corporations, 66 TAXES 1062 (1988); Steven E. Shay, Revisiting U.S. Anti-Deferral
Rules, 74 TAXS 1042 (1996).
15. See, e.g., Peggy B. Musgrave & Richard A. Musgrave, Fiscal Coordination and
Competition in an International Setting, in INFLUENCE OF TAX DwrnEN.rIALs ON INTERNATIONAL
ComaErrvEN1s 61, 74 (1990). In my analysis, I apply the horizontal equity analysis on a global
basis; thus, I conclude that allowance of a properly designed foreign tax credit is consistent with
the horizontal equity principle. Under a horizontal equity analysis applied only from a national
perspective, foreign taxes would be treated as merely another cost of earning income and, hence,
be only deductible and not creditable. However, such an approach would not adequately mitigate
international double taxation and would discourage U.S. persons from investing abroad.
1997)
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pay, the tax burden should be based on 'worldwide income.""'16
By contrast, a territorial system for taxing a U.S. person's foreign
source income violates this principle because it exempts such income
from U.S. tax altogether, and thus, does not base the taxpayer's tax lia-
bility on its ability to pay taxes. 17 A taxpayer can avoid tax liability by
shifting investments abroad, thus undermining the basic theoretical base
of the income tax system.' 8 Moreover, adoption of the territorial system
of taxation by the United States would likely lead to increased tax com-
petition by countries adopting tax holidays or ineffective taxation at the
source, thus undermining the fairness of international taxation viewed
from a global perspective. 19
Another key concept underlying our progressive income tax system
is the notion of vertical equity. This principle focuses on the appropriate
distribution of the income tax burden among those with different levels
of economic income. A progressive rate structure, which has been part
of our tax system in varying degrees for many years, is based on the
concept that those with higher levels of income should pay tax at pro-
gressively higher rates on their top (marginal) dollars of income and that
the income tax should be used for redistribution. Residence-based taxa-
tion is consistent with vertical equity because it bases a taxpayer's mar-
ginal rates on total worldwide income.2" By contrast, the territorial
system of taxing foreign source income is inconsistent with vertical
equity because it does not include a taxpayer's foreign source income in
the allocation of tax burdens among taxpayers with different levels of
worldwide income. Moreover, if the exemption system does not include
a domestic taxpayer's foreign source income in determining the tax-
payer's marginal rates of tax, it further undermines vertical equity by
allowing the taxpayer to pay lower marginal rates of tax on domestic
source income. That is, a domestic taxpayer will pay tax at a lower
marginal rate by dividing income between taxable domestic sources and
exempt foreign sources than by earning all of the income in the country
of residence.2'
16. Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the U.S.
System and its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11, 27 (Assaf Razin &
Joel Slemrod eds., 1990).
17. See Vrro TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 76-78 (1995).
18. Since an exemption system explicitly ignores foreign sources of income in allocating the
residence country's tax burden, even though that foreign income gives rise to a domestic
taxpayer's ability to pay taxes, it is fundamentally inconsistent with the theoretical underpinnings
of an income tax base.
19. See generally SOL licCIorro, INTERNATIONAL BusINEss TAXATION 46 (1992).
20. See, e.g., Green, supra note 14, at 29; U.S. TREAs. DEP'T, BLUEPRITS FOR BASIC TAX
REFORM 99 (1977).
21. Some countries with exemption systems have mitigated this problem by including the
[Vol. 51:975
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An ideal income tax system achieves economic efficiency if it is
neutral in the allocation of economic resources among various economic
activities. In the international tax context, capital export neutrality is
most consistent with this concept of neutrality because under a capital
export neutral tax system, U.S. taxpayers will determine the location of
investments based on their pretax returns, not on the basis of tax consid-
erations. 22 A residence-based tax system for taxing foreign source
income, combined with a foreign tax credit for foreign taxes paid, best
implements this neutrality principle. By contrast, a territorial system
encourages taxpayers to shift their resources to investments in low-tax
countries with lower pretax returns; thus, such a system is not economi-
cally efficient. 23
Furthermore, arguments by proponents of the exemption system
that a residence-based system for taxing international income under-
mines the international competitiveness of U.S. persons are fundamen-
tally flawed. The actual effect of taxes imposed by an investor's country
of residence on the ability of the investor to compete in the global mar-
ketplace has not been clearly established. If the investor is engaged in
business in a competitive foreign market, the price that the investor can
charge for its goods or services is primarily determined by the market
situation, not the level of taxes that the investor bears in his or her coun-
try of residence. It is, therefore, unlikely that taxes imposed by the
country of residence can have much effect on pricing, at least in the
short run. From this perspective, the competitiveness claims made by
proponents of the exemption system appear to be overstated.24 In any
event, to the extent that one believes that tax policy can and should be
used to improve the international competitiveness of U.S. persons, the
most economically efficient way to do so is to broaden the tax base and
reduce U.S. tax rates across the aboard, rather than reduce U.S. tax rates
taxpayer's foreign source income in the tax base solely for determining the taxpayer's rates of
taxation on domestic source income. This feature, however, adds complexity to the exemption
system and does not completely eliminate the fairness problem if the source country has lower tax
rates than the residence country.
22. Traditional economic analysis generally supports a conclusion that capital export
neutrality results in the most efficient international allocation of capital and maximizes worldwide
economic welfare. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, 102D CONG., 1ST Sass., FACTORS
AFFECTItNG THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITVENEsS OF Tm UNITED STATES, at 5 (1991)
("Economic analysis can demonstrate that for any capital import-neutral policy there is almost
always a superior revenue-neutral capital export-neutral policy.").
23. See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle, Foreign Tax Provisions of the American Jobs Act of 1996, 72
TAx NOTES 1165, 1166 (1996).
24. See. e.g., TiMo Vn-msKNrA, TAx INCENTWrES IN DaEvEiopro COUNTRIES AND
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 64 (1991).
19971
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to zero only on foreign source income.25
In addition, the territorial system of taxation may encourage source
countries to impose undesirably low taxes on business income in order
to compete for foreign capital. This competition may result in a "race to
the bottom," with countries imposing less than optimal levels of taxes
and providing less than optimal levels of public services.26 Moreover, as
suggested by Peggy Musgrave and Richard Musgrave, the movement of
capital to low-tax jurisdictions "permits the owner who resides in a high-
tax location to act as a free rider enjoying a high level of public services
without contributing to their cost. As a result, voting patterns will be
distorted, burdens will be shifted and an inefficient level of public provi-
sion will result. 27
The various types of modem business activities, such as global
trading, communications technologies, and electronic commerce, will
move the international tax system toward greater emphasis on residence-
based taxation in the future. These modem types of commerce do not fit
easily within traditional notions of associating items of income and
expense with a particular geographic location.28 Accordingly, these
modem types of commerce have undercut the rationale of source-based
taxation and weaken the case for shifting the U.S. international tax sys-
tem to a territorial system of taxing international income.
Another important argument against adopting an exemption system
is the pressure it would create on legislators to provide additional
source-based exemptions or preferences, which undermine the integrity
of the tax reform process. Suppose that, as part of the tax reform pro-
cess, Congress enacted an exemption system for the foreign source busi-
ness income of U.S. persons, on the ground that such an exemption is
necessary to enhance U.S. competitiveness in the global economy. How
would Congress respond to other industries pleading for special tax
assistance to compete in the modem economy? What line would Con-
gress be able to defensibly draw here? How would Congress respond to
the energy industry, which can make claims for special treatment on the
ground that it is engaged in a risky endeavor that has immense impor-
tance to the U.S. economy? What about the high-tech industry which
can make similar special claims? How can one make a valid argument
25. Cf. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 102D CONG., 1ST SEss., FACTORS AFFECTING TmE
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF a UNITED STATES, at 248 (1991).
26. For commentary on the harmful effects of international tax competition, see Charles E.
McLure, Jr., International Aspects of Tax Policy for the 21st Century, 8 AM. J. TAX PoL'Y 167
(1990).
27. See Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 15, at 69.
28. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, SELEcrED TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL ELECTRONIC
CoMMERCE 23 (1996).
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against creating special tax exemptions for all types of worthy industries
once the concept of special tax treatment to enhance competitiveness is
established?
Finally, a common argument in favor of the exemption system is its
potential for reducing the complexity of the tax system. Yet, the alleged
simplicity of the exemption system may be illusory. Any exemption
system that Congress is likely to enact would probably not substantially
simplify the U.S. international tax rules.
First, an exemption system would place great pressure on the
source-of-income rules, as well as the rules for allocating and apportion-
ing expenses. Under an exemption system, a taxpayer would have a
tremendous incentive to engage in tax-motivated schemes which shift
the source characterization (but not necessarily the economic factors of
production) of income to a low-tax foreign jurisdiction.2 9 Similarly, a
U.S. taxpayer would have an incentive to shift the allocation and appor-
tionment of deductions to U.S. source income to reduce its tax liability
on such income. Of course, these same pressures exist under our current
system, which uses the foreign tax credit to mitigate international double
taxation. The point here is that these pressures, which complicate the
existing international tax rules, would remain, and probably intensify,
under an exemption system.
Second, an exemption system also places great pressure on the
transfer pricing rules. U.S. taxpayers would be encouraged to engage in
aggressive transfer pricing to shift income to low-tax foreign countries
and thereby eliminate their U.S. tax liability on such income. Thus,
adoption of an exemption system would not reduce the difficulty of
policing transfer pricing abuses under the modified arm's length stan-
dard of existing law. Indeed, the pressure on the transfer pricing rules
would likely intensify under a territorial system which provides a perma-
nent exemption from U.S. tax for foreign source business income.
Third, an exemption system could include the rule used in some
foreign countries' tax systems that income is exempt from residence
country tax only if it incurs tax (or some specified minimum rate of tax)
in the source country. If that approach were adopted, the difficulties of
associating a foreign tax with a particular category of foreign source
income would be necessary, thus continuing one of the complicating
features of the current law foreign tax credit limits.
29. See Hugh J. Ault, Commentary, 9 Am. J. TAX PoL'Y 61, 65 (1991) (noting that we must
examine any proposal for adopting a territorial system in "the context of the U.S. tax culture," a
system with "aggressive taxpayers [and tax advisers] who play the rules to the limit").
Accordingly, it would be necessary to have detailed rules defining the scope of the exemption for
foreign source income with appropriate anti-abuse rules that would not be simple either in theory
or in practice.
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Alternatively, the exemption system might be structured to apply
only to active foreign business income, whether or not taxed in the
source country, and not apply to foreign source passive income which
would remain subject to U.S. tax. Such a modified exemption system
would, of course, continue many of the complexities of the current law
anti-deferral regimes and foreign tax credit rules, which require the sort-
ing of foreign source income into various categories of income.
Under either of these modified exemption systems, there would be
pressure for the United States to retain the foreign tax credit with respect
to foreign source passive income or low-taxed foreign source income,
since such income would still be exposed to taxation by both the United
States and the source country. This would significantly reduce the sim-
plification potential of the exemption system. Moreover, losses incurred
in an exempt category of foreign source income should not be allowed to
offset either U.S. source income or foreign source income in a non-
exempt category (although Congress would undoubtedly face pressure to
make exceptions to this rule); losses incurred in a non-exempt category
would presumably offset U.S. source income. This would raise policy
concerns similar to those that led to the enactment of section 904(f).
Congress would have to decide whether to retain some version of that
provision to deal with these concerns. Of course, retention of section
904(f), even in modified form, would reduce any simplicity gains
achieved by the exemption system.
IV. ANTI-DEFERRAL REFORM
The deferral principle is one of the most significant elements com-
plicating the U.S. international tax system. Under this principle, foreign
source income earned by a U.S. person through a foreign corporation is
generally not subject to U.S. tax until it is repatriated to the United
States in the form of dividends or through a sale of the foreign corpora-
tion's stock by the U.S. person. To combat abuse of that principle, the
United States has enacted a series of extremely complex and somewhat
overlapping anti-deferral regimes, which have provided much work for
tax attorneys, accountants, and treatise authors: (1) the foreign personal
holding company provisions, enacted in 1937; (2) the controlled foreign
corporation ("CFC") provisions, enacted in 1962; (3) the foreign invest-
ment company provisions, also enacted in 1962; and (4) the passive for-
eign investment company ("PFIC") provisions, enacted in 1986. In
addition, two penalty taxes aimed at preventing accumulation of earn-
ings at the corporate level to avoid the shareholder-level tax on dividend
distributions-the personal holding company tax provisions and the
accumulated earnings tax provisions-may apply to foreign corpora-
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tions owned by U.S. persons. Yet, despite this myriad of complex anti-
deferral regimes, the basic principle of deferral remains, a principle that
substantially undercuts the fairness and efficiency of the U.S. tax
system.
The deferral principle undercuts tax fairness by allowing U.S. per-
sons to avoid paying current U.S. tax on their economic income earned
through foreign corporations conducting business operations in low-tax
foreign countries, while U.S. persons with the same amounts of eco-
nomic income earned directly through a branch operation abroad or
through a business conducted in the United States must pay current U.S.
tax on their income. Moreover, the deferral principle encourages U.S.
persons to shift investments to low-tax foreign countries in violation of
capital export neutrality, thereby reducing worldwide economic welfare.
The complicated web of anti-deferral regimes of current law repre-
sents a compromise between ending deferral altogether and allowing
deferral of income earned through foreign corporations without limita-
tion. Congress has tinkered with the anti-deferral regimes over the years
by tightening up the definition of Subpart F income in the CFC provi-
sions and adding new anti-deferral regimes, as in 1986 with the intro-
duction of the PFIC regime. The tinkering, however, has only made the
system more complex without significantly eliminating the problems
caused by the deferral principle. 30  As a result, a ridiculously compli-
cated set of rules has evolved that makes deferral elective for the well-
advised U.S. taxpayer and creates traps for the unwary.3 1 For example,
a U.S. corporation is likely to elect branch status for a foreign entity
with income earned in a high-tax foreign country where a foreign tax
credit will offset any U.S. tax on the income. A U.S. corporation is also
likely to elect branch status for a foreign entity with losses so that the
losses can offset the U.S. corporation's income.
The elective nature of the deferral principle has been fortified and
made more explicit by the Treasury Department's recent adoption of the
30. For a recent proposal for further incremental limitation of deferral for CFCs, see the well-
meaning, but ineffective, American Jobs and Manufacturing Preservation Bill of 1996, introduced
by Senator Byron Dorgan. This proposal is aimed at the so-called "runaway plant" problem and
would end deferral on certain imported property income. This provision would add complexity to
the already overly complex Subpart F regime, without substantially eliminating the detrimental
economic effects of the deferral principle.
31. For discussion of those situations in which a U.S. person is likely to opt for termination of
deferral by electing branch status for a foreign entity, see Avi-Yonah, Simplification Potential of
Check-the-Box, supra note 13, at 220. See also NEw YORK STATE BAR ASS'N, TAX SECt.,
REPORT ON THE "CHECK-THE-Box" CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM PROPOSED IN NOTICE 95-14 (1995);
Michael L. Schler, Initial Thoughts on the Proposed "Check-the-Box" Regulations, 71 TAx
NOTES 1679 (1996).
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so-called check-the-box entity classification system. 2 Under this sys-
tem, U.S. persons operating abroad through foreign entities other than
per se foreign corporations, will more readily be able to elect deferral of
U.S. tax on their foreign source income by choosing whether to have the
foreign entities treated as corporations or partnerships (or branches in
the case of an entity with a single owner) for tax purposes.33 This essen-
tially elective deferral system is unacceptable from a policy point of
view and needs to be changed in order to accomplish any significant
reform of the U.S. international tax system.
Less radical proposals have been advanced to simplify the anti-
deferral regimes by expanding the definition of Subpart F income in the
CFC provisions and combining the other anti-deferral regimes aimed
primarily at passive income into one or two unified regimes.34 These
efforts might achieve some marginal improvement over the current law,
but I believe that more radical reform of the anti-deferral regimes is
necessary. At a minimum, it is time to repeal deferral for U.S. share-
holders of CFCs and reformulate the PFIC provisions to constitute the
only anti-deferral regime aimed primarily at passive income earned by
U.S. persons through non-controlled foreign corporations.
Undoubtedly, U.S. multinationals and commentators who advocate
the capital import neutrality standard would oppose any proposal to
repeal deferral for CFCs on the ground that repealing deferral would
substantially impair the international competitiveness of U.S. persons
operating businesses abroad. They would argue that repeal of deferral
would impose an extra cost (a current U.S. tax) on U.S. multinationals
operating in low-tax foreign countries-a cost not borne by their com-
petitors from countries which allow deferral or use a territorial system
for taxing foreign source income-and, would, thus, erode their compet-
itive position in the global economy. However, this argument assumes
that firms from different countries have to pay the same tax rate in the
32. See T.D. 8697, 1997-2 I.R.B. 22.
33. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Simplification Potential of Check-the-Box, supra note 13; Schler,
supra note 31. This adoption of elective deferral in the entity classification regulations
substantially undercuts one of the arguments made by some opponents of proposals to abolish
deferral-that ending deferral will be a major revenue loser, given the collateral consequences of
ending deferral. See Avi-Yonah, Simplification Potential of Check-the-Box, supra note 13, at 221.
Certain foreign entities are treated as per se corporations for federal tax purposes and cannot
elect partnership classification under the check-the-box system. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(8)
(1996). Nevertheless, for U.S. persons operating abroad through such entities, the less explicit
and more complicated elective deferral techniques used before adoption of the check-the-box
system should be available in many situations.
34. The other anti-deferral regimes aimed primarily at passive income are the foreign
personal holding company provisions, the PFIC provisions, the foreign investment company
provisions, and the accumulated earnings tax and personal holding company tax provisions,
insofar as they apply to foreign corporations owned by U.S. persons.
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host country for international investment to be allocated efficiently-an
assumption that is incorrect. As stated by Jane Gravelle:
[Arguments against further restricting deferral focus] on a vague
term-"competitiveness"-when what should really be considered is
efficiency. There is no reason that firms from different countries
need to pay the same tax rate in a location for investment to be allo-
cated efficiently; the important thing is for a firm to face the same tax
rate wherever its location. If firms face the same tax rate in each
location and earn the same after-tax return in each location, their
pretax return on their marginal investments will be equal. The pretax
return measures the true economic productivity of capital.
We are operating in a second-best world because other coun-
tries, like ourselves, do not tax currently the returns of their firms in
foreign jurisdictions. All marginal investments by foreign firms in
tax haven countries, therefore, tend to have lower pretax returns than
investments in higher tax rate countries. Regardless of what these
other firms do, it is more efficient for our firms to move some invest-
ment back to the United States, when tax rates are lower abroad, if
they are earning a lower rate of pretax return tax in the tax haven and
thus are less productive than an investment in the United States. 35
I would propose treating a CFC as a passthrough entity with respect
to its U.S. shareholders.36 U.S. shareholders of the CFC would be
treated as if they earned a pro rata share of the CFC's gross income and
expense and would currently include such income or expense in comput-
ing their own U.S. tax liability.37 Each U.S. shareholder could claim a
direct credit for the foreign taxes paid by the CFC during the year to the
extent they constitute creditable taxes under section 901 or 903 (subject
to the limit in section 904). Under this passthrough regime, a U.S.
shareholder of a CFC, including a U.S. multinational corporation, would
be allowed to reduce its taxable income by its pro rata share of the
CFC's losses.
To determine each U.S. shareholder's pro rata share of the CFC's
35. See Gravelle, supra note 23, at 1168 (responding to arguments made by Peter Merrill &
Carol Dunahoo, 'Runaway Plant' Legislation: Rhetoric and Reality, 72 TAx NoTEs 221 (1996)).
36. Adopting this proposal for ending deferral for CFCs would probably require renegotiation
of the existing U.S. income tax treaties in order to avoid a serious "treaty override" problem. See,
e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERNATIONAL TAx REFoRM: AN INTERIM REPORT 50 (1993)
[hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INTERIM REP.]. In any event, the United States should seek to
develop an international consensus among its major trading partners for repealing tax deferral on
the foreign income of CFCs.
37. The current definitions of "U.S. shareholder" in section 951(b) and "controlled foreign
corporation" in section 957 would be retained, as would the direct, indirect, and constructive
ownership rules of section 958. Some modification of the constructive ownership rules would be
desirable. For example, I would expand the family attribution rules to include attribution of stock
from siblings.
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income, losses, and foreign taxes, passthrough rules similar to those
developed under Subchapter K would apply in modified form. Basis
adjustments similar to those in section 705 would also apply to prevent
double taxation of the CFC's earnings when they are distributed as a
*dividend, or when the CFC's stock is sold, and any losses flowing
through from the CFC to the U.S. shareholder would be limited to the
extent of the U.S. shareholder's basis in the CFC's stock, much like the
section 704(d) limit on the deduction of partnership losses. Distribu-
tions from the CFC would be tax-free to the extent of the U.S. share-
holder's basis in the CFC's stock, and any excess would be treated as
gain from the sale of the CFC's stock.
This proposal would significantly simplify the Code's international
tax provisions. First, the rules in sections 952 through 954, defining the
various types of Subpart F income, could be repealed with respect to
post-enactment earnings of CFCs because they would be unnecessary in
a current inclusion regime encompassing all of the CFC's income. The
policy rationales underlying sections 956 and 1248 would also no longer
be valid and both of these complicated provisions could be repealed.
Second, the indirect foreign tax credit provisions in sections 902
and 960 could be repealed, at least with respect to post-enactment earn-
ings of foreign corporations. Each U.S. shareholder of the CFC would
obtain a direct credit for its pro rata shares of the foreign taxes paid by
the CFC. Moreover, to eliminate the indirect credit rules for U.S. share-
holders of foreign corporations that are not CFCs, U.S. persons owning
at least 10 percent of the voting power of a foreign corporation that is
not a CFC would be allowed to elect current inclusion treatment with
respect to the foreign corporation and obtain a direct credit for their pro
rata share of the foreign taxes paid by the foreign corporation.38 To
prevent a taxpayer from turning this election into a "heads I win, tails
you lose" proposition for the Treasury, a U.S. person's election with
respect to any particular foreign corporation would be revocable only
with the consent of the IRS.
It might be argued that an individual U.S. shareholder of a foreign
38. Thus, if no election were made, a 10-percent-or-more U.S. shareholder of a foreign
corporation, that is not a CFC or PFIC, could continue to defer U.S. tax on the foreign
corporation's earnings; however, the price of continued deferral would be no foreign tax credit for
any foreign taxes paid by the foreign corporation.
Alternatively, as suggested by David Tillinghast in his response to this paper, if one wanted
to expand my anti-deferral proposal, one could apply the CFC definition based on concentrated
stock ownership (i.e., more than 50 percent of the voting power or value of the foreign
corporation's stock) by U.S. or foreign 10-percent-or-more shareholders and require current
inclusion by any 10-percent-or-more U.S. shareholder in such a foreign corporation. See David R.
Tillinghast, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1013, 1015 (1997). I view this suggestion as a friendly
amendment to my anti-deferral proposal.
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corporation should not be allowed to obtain a foreign tax credit for his or
her share of the corporation's foreign taxes. By analogy to the rationale
for not allowing an individual 10-percent shareholder of a foreign corpo-
ration to obtain an indirect foreign tax credit under current section 902,
the argument would be that allowing the credit is fundamentally incon-
sistent with the double-taxation U.S. corporate tax regime and creates a
bias in favor of foreign corporate investment over U.S. corporate invest-
ment. According to this premise, an individual would be limited to tak-
ing a deduction only for foreign taxes passing through from the foreign
corporation. This is equivalent to disallowing a U.S. individual an indi-
rect credit under current law because the individual reports his or her net
share of the foreign corporation's after-tax foreign earnings when they
are distributed.
I, however, would recommend allowing a U.S. individual to obtain
a direct credit for his or her share of the foreign corporation's taxes.
Under the current tax system, with check-the-box entity classification
and limited liability companies, Subchapter S corporations, and the abil-
ity of many closely-held corporations to zero out their tax liability
through deductible compensation, rent, and royalties paid to sharehold-
ers, double taxation of a business entity's income is an aberration, rather
than the norm, except in the case of publicly traded entities. Moreover,
since U.S. individuals would rarely own 10 percent or more of the stock
of publicly traded foreign corporations, it is unlikely that this proposal
would create any great disparity in the treatment of domestic and foreign
publicly traded entities. In any event, one could argue that a 10-percent
equity interest in a foreign corporation is more analogous to a branch,
rather than a portfolio investment, even in the case of individual
shareholders.
With respect to a U.S. person owning stock in a foreign corporation
(no matter how small the ownership interest) that is not a CFC, but that
earns primarily passive income, one anti-deferral regime should remain,
patterned after the PFIC provisions of current law. 39 However, to sim-
plify the PFIC rules, current inclusion of the PFIC's income should
become mandatory.4" The complex rules relating to the interest charge
39. Moreover, as suggested by David Tillinghast in his response to this paper, certain
revisions in the definition of a PFIC may be necessary and appropriate, for example, to avoid
deterring U.S. portfolio investment in foreign start-up situations. Id. at 1016.
40. In the case of a foreign corporation that is a PFIC, but not a CFC, any 10-percent-or-more
U.S. shareholder would have mandatory current inclusion; thus, the election for 10-percent-or-
more U.S. shareholders of a foreign corporation that is not a CFC would not apply. Such 10-
percent-or-more U.S. shareholders would be allowed a direct credit for their share of the PFIC's
creditable foreign taxes, provided that they had sufficient information to establish the amount and
creditability of such foreign taxes.
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on excess distributions and the elective mark-to-market regime should
be repealed.4' If the U.S. person owning shares in the PFIC does not
have sufficient information to use the current inclusion method, an alter-
native "deemed rate of return of method" could be used by multiplying
the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the PFIC by a rate of return adjusted and
published annually by the IRS (e.g., the rate of interest paid by the gov-
ernment on tax refunds plus two or three percentage points).42 Alterna-
tively, to avoid some of the criticisms advanced by David Tillinghast
and others to this "deemed rate of return method," a U.S. person owning
shares in a PFIC could be allowed to base the amount of the current
inclusion on available financial information of the PFIC, as adjusted to
reflect U.S. tax accounting principles for certain "material items" that
could be "reasonably identified" by the U.S. person. 3
As part of this proposal, the foreign personal holding company pro-
visions and foreign investment company provisions would no longer be
necessary and would be repealed. Moreover, the personal holding com-
pany tax provisions and accumulated earnings tax provisions would be
amended to exempt foreign corporations from their reach.
Several problems with this proposal exist, which would require fur-
ther analysis before this proposal could be enacted. Adopting this pro-
posal would require complicated transition rules, which would
necessitate the retention of many of the provisions of current law with
respect to pre-enactment foreign corporate earnings. Moreover, as the
Subchapter K provisions demonstrate, rules allocating the source and
character of the income and expenses of an entity to its owners are com-
plex in operation. Adopting this proposal would, undoubtedly, put great
pressure on those allocation rules and raise many new issues concerning
their application. Thus, one could argue that by increasing the number
of cases in which the application of passthrough rules would be neces-
For purposes of determining stock ownership in a PFIC under the proposed reformulated
PFIC regime, attribution rules similar to those in current section 1297(a) would apply.
41. See Avi-Yonah, Simplification Potential of Check-the-Box, supra note 13, at 223; see also
Michael J. McIntyre, Collecting Current Tax From U.S.-Resident Individuals and U.S.-Based
MNEs on Income Earned Through Foreign Entities, 11 TAx Noms INT'L 440, 444-45 (1996)
[hereinafter McIntyre, Collecting Current Tax].
42. The rate should be set high enough to avoid creating any bias in favor of investment in
foreign investment funds over domestic investment funds. McIntyre, Collecting Current Tax,
supra note 41, at 445.
This "deemed rate of return" method could be patterned after a similar method used in New
Zealand under its PFIC rules. For a discussion of the PFIC rules in New Zealand and several
other countries, see Brian J. Arnold, The Taxation of Investments in Passive Foreign Investment
Funds in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, in EsSAYS ON INTERNATONAL
TAXATION 5 (Herbert H. Alpert & Kees van Raad eds., 1993).
43. See Shay, supra note 14, at 1061.
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sary, this proposal adds to the complexity of the U.S. international tax
system.
I have two responses to that argument. First, any added complexity
from the extension of passthrough rules to all U.S. shareholders of
CFCs, and electing 10-percent U.S. shareholders of foreign corporations
that are not CFCs, would be offset by the proposal's significant simplifi-
cation of the international tax system in other respects through elimina-
tion of many of the provisions in Subpart F, simplification of the
operation of the PFIC regime, elimination of the other anti-deferral
regimes aimed at passive income, and elimination of the indirect credit
provisions in sections 902 and 960. Second, with the adoption of an
elective entity classification system, an extension of the application of
the passthrough rules to U.S. persons owning interests in foreign entities
is inevitable since more U.S. taxpayers are likely to operate abroad
through foreign entities that will be classified as partnerships or unincor-
porated branches for federal tax purposes. Thus, adoption of the check-
the-box entity classification system requires a rethinking and redesign of
the Subchapter K rules for allocating the income and expenses (and lia-
bilities) of an organization treated as a partnership for tax purposes
among its members. These rules were designed for a different era, not
the modern era in which flowthrough treatment through a variety of dif-
ferent types of business organization, including the domestic limited lia-
bility company, is widely used for both domestic and foreign activities.
My proposal would not achieve complete neutrality as to choice of
entity in the international context. For example, under this proposal, a
U.S. person who does not, actually or constructively, own at least 10
percent of the voting power of a foreign corporation would not be able
to obtain passthrough treatment with respect to a foreign entity that is a
per se foreign corporation under the new entity classification regula-
tions. That person would defer any U.S. tax on foreign source income
earned through the foreign corporation until the income was distributed
as a dividend. This income would be taxed as ordinary income and
carry no credit for the foreign taxes paid by the foreign corporation
(even in the case of a U.S. corporate shareholder). By contrast, a U.S.
person owning less than 10 percent of a foreign entity that is not a per se
foreign corporation, and which has elected to be treated as a partnership
for U.S. tax purposes, would be able to obtain passthrough treatment for
the income and expenses of the entity and a direct foreign tax credit for
the foreign taxes paid by the entity. Thus, in the case of an under 10-
percent shareholder of a foreign entity who does not want deferral, a
bias would still exist in favor of using an entity that is not a per se
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foreign corporation. Of course, that bias exists under the elective defer-
ral regime and indirect foreign tax credit provisions of current law.
Adoption of this proposal would likely generate numerous other
potential collateral tax simplification benefits. For example, the adop-
tion of this proposal should significantly reduce the number of outbound
transfer pricing disputes and should reduce pressure on the section 367
rules as a backstop in preventing abuse of the deferral principle," thus
permitting simplification of those increasingly complex and incoherent
rules.
In addition, this anti-deferral proposal opens the door to adopting
the worldwide fungibility method of interest allocation for U.S. multina-
tionals and their U.S. and foreign affiliates. Under the simplest
approach to this allocation, the interest expense of U.S. and foreign affil-
iates would be combined. This aggregate amount of interest expense
would be allocated to the worldwide income of the entire group, includ-
ing the foreign affiliates, by reference to the assets of all members of the
group. This method is not practical under current law, where deferral is
still the general rule, and, hence, where moving interest deductions from
a foreign affiliate to a U.S. parent is not feasible. However, this method
would be workable in the passthrough regime for taxing CFCs discussed
above. This approach to interest allocation would both simplify the tax
law and improve economic efficiency by reducing the effect of tax con-
siderations in the financing decisions of U.S. multinational corporations
and their affiliates.45
V. REFORMS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT PROVISIONS
A. Reform the Foreign Tax Credit Limit in Section 904
Assuming that we do not move to a "pure" territorial system for
taxing the foreign source income of U.S. persons, the foreign tax credit
will remain a fundamental aspect of the U.S. international tax system.46
The basic premise of the credit is sound-to prevent double taxation of
foreign source income that would serve as a serious disincentive to for-
eign investment by U.S. persons, the United States grants a dollar-for-
dollar credit to U.S. persons for qualifying foreign income taxes paid on
44. See id. at 1061-62.
45. See U.S. TREAS. DfP'T, INTERIM REP., supra note 36, at 36-38.
46. Some proponents of the exemption approach argue that adoption of the exemption system
would greatly simplify the U.S. international tax provisions because it would lead to repealing the
complicated foreign tax credit provisions in the Code. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Proposal for
Simplification, supra note 13, at 1354-59; see also HUFBAUER, supra note 11, at 136. As
discussed earlier in the text, this would probably not hold true if, as is likely, only a modified
exemption system were enacted.
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foreign source income.47 Moreover, as discussed above, despite the
inconsistency with pure capital export neutrality notions, it makes sense
for the United States to impose an overall limit on the credit to prevent
foreign taxes in excess of the U.S. rate from reducing the U.S. tax on
U.S. source income. It also makes sense for the United States to attempt
to further refine the overall limit to prevent the cross-crediting of high
foreign taxes on some foreign income against the U.S. tax on other low-
taxed foreign income. Unless steps are taken to prevent such cross-cred-
iting, a U.S. taxpayer with high-taxed foreign income has a tax incentive
to shift investments to low-tax foreign countries in violation of capital
export neutrality. The question is how best to achieve that goal in light
of the administrative burdens that a multi-category foreign tax credit
limit places on both taxpayers and the government.
One alternative for reform in this area is to adopt a per-country
limit, with separate basket limits applied country by country, as was
proposed by the Reagan Administration in 1984 and 1985.48 Most for-
eign countries with a foreign tax credit limit use a per-country limit, and
a per-country limit was used in the United States from 1932 to 1976,
either alone or in combination with an overall limit. In 1986, Congress
did not enact the Administration's proposal for a per-country foreign tax
credit limit, in part, because it viewed the proposal as too complicated.49
Yet, despite its complexity, a per-country limit with at least a separate
passive basket for each country is appealing because it would be more
47. One radical simplification proposal, consistent with national neutrality, would be to repeal
the foreign tax credit and replace it with a deduction for foreign taxes. Such a proposal, if
combined with a repeal of deferral for U.S. shareholders of CFCs, would make the source-of-
income rules and the rules for allocating and apportioning deductions irrelevant for most U.S.
persons, as well as eliminate most outbound transfer pricing issues. However, despite its potential
for greatly simplifying the U.S. international tax system, I do not favor this approach because it
would seriously discourage foreign investment by U.S. persons and undermine worldwide
economic welfare (and, in the long run, undermine U.S. economic welfare as well). Moreover,
since the deduction approach to mitigating double taxation is inconsistent with current
international norms, the United States' adoption of such an approach would seriously undermine
the stability of the international tax regime.
48. See generally 2 U.S. TlEAs. DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAmNESS, SimILICrry, AND
ECONOMIC GRowTH 360-63 (1984); U.S. TREAs. DE 'T, THE PRFSna'NT's TAX PROPOSALS TO THE
CONGREss FOR FAIRNESS, GRowTH, AND SIMPLIcrry 385-96 (1985).
49. See, e.g., Al International Tax Study, supra note 10, at 323-26, 328. Congress also
believed that allowing some substantial cross-crediting within the general basket limit was
"consistent with the integrated nature of U.S. multinational operations abroad." STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAX'N, 99M CONG., IST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF
1986, at 862 (1987). Moreover, Congress' rejection of the Reagan Administration's per-country
foreign tax credit limit proposal in 1986 was based in part on its belief that adoption of such a
proposal would undermine the "international competitiveness" of U.S. multinational corporations
operating abroad. This "international competitiveness" argument against adopting a per-country
limit suffers from all of the problems raised earlier in the text concerning such "international
competitiveness" arguments generally.
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effective in preventing cross-crediting than the basket limits of current
law. Accordingly, such an approach merits further study to see whether
a workable per-country limit can be formulated. The concerns about
complexity may be overstated, particularly in a U.S. tax world where
lookthrough rules are common and where the alternative is the complex
separate basket limits of current law. Stated differently, how much more
complicated is a per-country limit system than the basket limits of cur-
rent law, particularly if only a passive income basket and a residual
income basket are used in each country? 50
The basket limit approach of current law is, of course, a compro-
mise between an overall limit, which would place no limits on cross-
crediting, and a per-item limit, which would place a separate limit on
each item of foreign income receiving special tax treatment by a foreign
country. If a per-country limit is not feasible, the question becomes
whether we can improve on the current law compromise by both simpli-
fying the basket limits and making them more effective in preventing the
cross-crediting of high and low foreign taxes in situations where such
cross-crediting and its distortive effects on economic behavior are most
likely to occur. The following suggestions may help remedy the
problem.
First, the passive income basket in section 904(d)(1)(A), which is
aimed at preventing cross-crediting with respect to low-taxed and highly
mobile income such as interest, dividends, rent, royalties, and other
types of portfolio investment income, is an essential component of any
foreign tax credit limit based on type of income.5' One defect in the
current passive income basket would be cured by expanding the passive
income basket to include all royalties, as proposed by the Clinton
Administration in 1993, since royalty income is usually subject to low
rates of foreign tax. Under current law, certain related-person royalties
and royalties derived in the active conduct of a trade or business are
placed in the general income basket, which permits high foreign taxes on
other business income to be cross-credited against this low-taxed
income, thus often resulting in an effective zero rate of U.S. and foreign
tax on such income.52
50." Another alternative would be to separate the overall limit into only two separate baskets-
a high-tax basket, which would include all foreign income taxed at a rate in excess of the U.S. rate
or some specified percentage of the U.S. rate, and a low-tax basket, which would include all other
foreign income. At first, this approach is appealing in terms of its apparent simplicity (only two
baskets) and its ability to forestall cross-crediting; however, properly designed high-tax/low-tax
baskets would be considerably complex in operation. See, e.g., ALl INi'~mA1'IONAL TAX STUDY,
supra note 10, at 328-32.
51. See I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(A) (1996).
52. See Michael J. McIntyre, Separate Basket Limitations in Theory and in Practice, 70 TAx
NomFs 1393, 1398 (1996) [hereinafter McIntyre, Separate Basket Limitations); see also Julie
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Another defect in the passive income basket is the special exception
for export financing interest. This exception is another export incentive
in the Code that complicates the foreign tax credit limit, undermines the
fairness of the tax system, and most likely, has little effect on stimulat-
ing exports. Consequently, this special exception should be repealed
and all export financing interest should be placed in the passive income
basket.
Substantial simplification of the passive income basket would be
achieved by eliminating the high-tax kickout.5 3 The high-tax kickout"
removes from the passive basket foreign source passive income on
which the effective foreign tax rate exceeds the top U.S. statutory rate
and places such income in the general income basket. It has a worthy
purpose; it eliminates any incentive for a U.S. taxpayer with high-taxed
passive income to shift other passive investments to low-tax foreign
countries for cross-crediting purposes. However, U.S. persons will
rarely have high-taxed passive income since such income is usually
taxed, if at all, at rates below the highest U.S. rate. The question is
whether the relatively few situations in which the opportunities for
cross-crediting in the passive income category will arise are sufficient to
justify the administrative burden placed on taxpayers and the govern-
ment by retention of this rule. Since the answer is probably negative,
the high-tax kickout should be repealed as a simplification measure.'
The high withholding tax interest basket creates a separate basket
limit for interest income subject to a foreign withholding tax or other
gross basis tax of at least five percent.55 This basket limit is aimed at
removing a perceived incentive for certain U.S. creditors to make loans
to foreign borrowers in countries which impose high withholding taxes
on interest (rather than to U.S. borrowers), pass the high withholding tax
on to the foreign borrower in the form of a higher interest rate, and
credit the high withholding tax against other low-taxed income in the
passive income basket.56 The primary targets of this limit appear to be
certain U.S. financial institutions; yet, the limit applies to all U.S. tax-
payers with high withholding tax interest. It is unclear whether the
cross-crediting problem to be solved with this basket limit is serious
Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REv.
1753, 1774-75 (1995).
53. See I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(A)(iii)(1I), 904(d)(2)(F) (1996).
54. See, e.g., David R. Tillinghast, International Tax Simplification, 8 Am. J. TAx POL'Y 187,
219-21 (1990) (suggesting that any problem areas involving related parties and back-to-back loans
that seek to manipulate the interest allocation rules could be handled by authorizing the Treasury
Department to create an anti-abuse rule in the regulations).
55. See I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(B), 904(d)(2)(B) (1996).
56. See STAFF OF JoINr Comm. ON TAx'N, 100rI CONG., 1ST SFss., GENE.RA EXPLANATION
OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 864-65 (1987).
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enough to warrant the complexities caused by creating a special limit for
such interest income. A more sensible approach might be to eliminate
this special basket limit and include this interest income in the passive
income basket for taxpayers that are not financial institutions, and in the
financial services basket for taxpayers that are financial institutions.57
On the other hand, in the unlikely event that the cross-crediting abuses
involving high withholding tax interest are sufficiently serious to war-
rant a special basket limit, that basket limit should be applied only to
taxpayers that are financial institutions.58
The separate limits for financial services income and shipping
income are aimed at preventing low-taxed, active foreign business
income from being combined with other types of high-taxed, foreign
income in the general income basket. Since the income in these two
baskets is rarely subject to foreign taxes in excess of the U.S. rate, one
simplification option would be to eliminate these separate basket limits
and place financial services income and shipping income in the passive
basket. 59 However, retention of the shipping income basket might be
necessary because a U.S. taxpayer could have high-taxed income from
shipping operations in some countries or might have losses from such
operations in the early years that should not be grouped with other low-
taxed income in the passive income basket.6 °
If the proposal to repeal the FSC provisions discussed below were
enacted, we would no longer need the separate basket limits in sections
904(d)(1)(F) through (H), at least at some time in the future. In any
event, because these separate limits are aimed at preventing cross-credit-
ing with respect to low-taxed foreign income, they could be combined
with the passive income basket and achieve substantially the same pur-
pose with less complexity. 61
Adoption of my proposal to allow 10-percent-or-more U.S. share-
holders to elect lookthrough treatment with respect to a non-controlled
foreign corporation would permit repeal of the section 904(d)(1)(E) bas-
ket for dividends from each non-controlled section 902 corporation
because that proposal would repeal the indirect credit in section 902 (at
least for future years). Even if this anti-deferral proposal were not
adopted, section 904(d)(1)(E) should be repealed and lookthrough rules
57. See Tillinghast, supra note 54, at 229-30.
58. See U.S. TREAs. DEP'T, INTERIM REP., supra note 36, at 22.
59. See id. at 21. If the separate financial services income basket is retained, the exception for
export financing interest should be repealed. Such interest should receive the same treatment as
the financial service entity's other financial services income.
60. See Tillinghast, supra note 54, at 231.
61. See U.S. TREAs. DEP'T, INrFERi REP., supra note 36, at 21; see also Tillinghast, supra
note 54, at 230-31.
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similar to those in section 904(d)(3) should be applied to dividends from
non-controlled foreign corporations.
Congress and the Treasury are properly concerned that oil-produc-
ing countries have an incentive to take advantage of the U.S. foreign
credit system by imposing high foreign taxes on such income that are
actually disguised royalties for the U.S. taxpayer's exploitation of the
countries' natural resources. Although the dual-capacity regulations
attempt to prevent these abuses of the foreign tax credit regime, they do
not completely solve the problem. Thus, it is probably necessary to
retain a special limit on the foreign taxes attributable to foreign oil and
gas income, as defined in section 907;62 but, for conceptual consistency,
that limit should be converted into a separate basket limit in section
904(d), as proposed by the Clinton Administration in 1996 and 1997.
The remaining and most important issue is what to do about the
general income basket. On one hand, proponents of capital import neu-
trality argue that U.S. taxpayers should be allowed to cross-credit high
and low foreign taxes in the general basket because their foreign com-
petitors from countries using a foreign tax credit system are allowed to
cross-credit high and low taxes on foreign business income and those
from countries with an exemption system are effectively allowed to do
so. On the other hand, allowing cross-crediting in the general income
basket encourages U.S. taxpayers with high-taxed foreign business
income to shift other business operations to low-tax foreign countries.
Consequently, this takes the pressure off high-tax foreign countries to
reduce their tax rates to avoid discouraging U.S. investment. In effect,
by allowing cross-crediting within the general income basket, the United
States is subsidizing those foreign countries with tax rates on the busi-
ness income of U.S. taxpayers in excess of the U.S. rate. Thus, these
opportunities for cross-crediting in the general income basket move the
U.S. international tax system away from the capital export neutrality
principle and undermine the U.S. residence-based taxing jurisdiction.
Adoption of my anti-deferral proposal would provide more opportunities
for cross-crediting and more pressure would be placed on the general
income basket. In fact, this proposal for repealing deferral will not have
much effect in reinforcing the residence-based taxation of U.S. persons'
foreign business income, unless steps are also taken to restrict the cross-
crediting opportunities in the general income basket.6"
As suggested by Professor Michael McIntyre, one possible way to
62. See I.R.C. § 907 (1996).
63. Cf Kingson, The Foreign Tax Credit, supra note 5, at 19 ("Repealing deferral might have
real bite if the general limitation category did not treat high- and low-taxed business income as
fungible.").
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improve the capital export neutrality of the general income basket would
be to divide the basket into a high-tax country general basket and a low-
tax country general basket." The high-tax country basket would include
only the foreign source income in the general basket limit that is attribu-
table to countries with which the United States has a modem tax treaty
and that have tax rates comparable to, or higher than, the U.S. rates. 65
The low-tax country basket would include all other foreign source
income in the general income basket.6 Although this proposal would
add complexity to the operation of the general income basket, unlike a
high-tax/low-tax limit system, it would not require a U.S. taxpayer to
determine effective foreign tax rates on its foreign source income.67  It
would substantially reduce the cross-crediting opportunities in the gen-
eral income basket and, therefore, is an appealing device for fortifying
the integrity of the foreign tax credit limit at an acceptable cost in terms
of added complexity.
B. Recapture Treatment for Overall U.S. Losses
Section 904(0 provides for the recapture of an "overall foreign
loss" where a U.S. person sustains an overall foreign loss in one tax year
which offsets U.S. source income in that year.68 That provision requires
that the U.S. person's foreign source income in later years be
recharacterized as U.S. source income to the extent of the overall foreign
lOSS. 69 Under current law, there is no similar recharacterization treat-
ment for an overall U.S. loss that offsets foreign source income and
reduces the taxpayer's foreign tax credit limit. U.S. source income in
later years is not recharacterized as foreign source income to the extent
of the overall U.S. loss. 70 This lack of parallel treatment for overall U.S.
and foreign losses is inequitable and may result in excessive residual
U.S. taxation of foreign source income.71 The statute should be
amended to provide that, to the extent an overall U.S. loss offsets foreign
source income and reduces a taxpayer's foreign tax credit limit in a year,
64. See McIntyre, Separate Basket Limitations, supra note 52, at 1398.
65. See id. The United States could refine the process further by requiring that the income be
subject to some tax in the foreign treaty country to be includible in the high-tax country general
basket. This would exclude from the high-tax country general basket foreign source business
income that is not taxed at all by the source country because the U.S. taxpayer does not have a
permanent establishment or fixed base to which the income is attributable.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See I.R.C. § 904(f) (1996).
69. See I.R.C. § 904(0(1) (1996).
70. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, INmRxM REP., supra note 36, at 27.
71. Id. This report also suggests several alternative approaches that might simplify the
treatment of losses for foreign tax credit purposes. Id. See also ALl INTRNATlONAL TAX ST Y,
supra note 10, at 367-74.
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U.S. source income in later years will be resourced as foreign source
income for purposes of the foreign tax credit limit.
C. Adopt De Minimis Rule
Regardless of the approach used in formulating the foreign tax
credit limit for U.S. taxpayers with large dollar amounts of foreign tax
credits (i.e., separate basket limits, a per-country limit, or a high-tax/
low-tax limit), the complications of that formulation should not apply to
taxpayers with relatively small dollar amounts of foreign tax credits.
When applied to such taxpayers, the amount of revenue that is obtained
from a full-scale application of the separate foreign tax credit limits is
greatly outweighed by the compliance burden such limits place on tax-
payers and the government. Accordingly, it would be desirable to enact
a simplified, overall limit on the foreign tax credit that would apply to
taxpayers whose creditable foreign taxes for a taxable year do not
exceed a specified amount (e.g., $10,000).72 As suggested by David Til-
linghast, this simplified limit should be mandatory, not elective. 73 Elec-
tions may require alternate computations which undercut the simplicity
gains from adoption of the de minimis rule and increase the revenue loss
from the rule due to self-selection problems.74
D. Repeal Special 90-Percent Cap on the Foreign Tax Credit for
Alternative Minimum Tax Purposes
The existence of an alternative minimum tax system, in effect an
alternative tax system with different rules and tax rates than our regular
income tax system, is an embarrassing admission of the failure of our
legislative process to produce a fair and economically efficient income
tax system. Hopefully, repeal of the alternative minimum tax system
would be possible as part of a major tax reform effort. This effort would
broaden the base by directly eliminating and reducing tax preferences,
and thereby undercut the theoretical justifications for the minimum tax
system. Whether or not the entire alternative minimum tax system is
repealed, section 59(a)(2), which contains the special 90-percent cap on
the foreign tax credit for alternative minimum tax purposes, should be
repealed. The limit is arbitrary (what is the basis for a ninety percent
limit?), has little or no policy justification, adds complexity to foreign
tax credit planning and compliance, and is inconsistent with the capital
export neutrality standard which underlies the foreign tax credit. The
72. See, e.g., Tillinghast, supra note 54, at 233-34.
73. See id. at 234.
74. ld.
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foreign tax credit provisions should be simplified by eliminating this
provision.
VI. THE TRANSFER PRICING PROBLEM
Resolving the intercompany transfer pricing dilemma is an impor-
tant issue related to many of the other issues discussed in this paper.7"
For many years, experts in the United States and throughout the world
have been vigorously debating the proper conceptual approach to resolv-
ing this issue-broadly speaking, the arm's length pricing standard, or a
formulary apportionment method. That debate will likely continue for
some time into the future. Although a detailed discussion of transfer
pricing issues is beyond the scope of this paper, I provide the following
limited comments on the transfer pricing problem.
A. Move Toward Apportionment Methodology
Based on my own professional experiences and my study of the
fine work of Professors Reuven Avi-Yonah, Jerome Hellerstein, Stanley
Langbein, and numerous other knowledgeable commentators,76 I am
persuaded that, in many situations, the arm's length standard does not
work well either in theory or in practice.77 Accordingly, the greater use
of apportionment methodology by the United States and its trading part-
ners is likely to be a major component of the long-term answer to the
international transfer pricing dilemma.78 I recognize, however, that the
75. One leading commentator has stated that "intercompany trade accounted for nearly a third
of world manufacturing trade and a quarter of world trade in the 1980's." Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15
VA. TAx REv. 89, 152 (1995) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length].
Another article recently stated that almost one-half of all transnational business and investment
activity in the developed countries of the world involves transactions between related parties.
Ernst & Young, LLP, Ernst & Young 1995 Transfer Pricing Documentation Survey, 72 TAX
NoTEs 1025, 1025 (1996).
76. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length, supra note 75; see also Jerome
R. Hellerstein, Federal Income Taxation of Multinationals: Replacement of Separate Accounting
With Formulary Apportionment, 60 TAX NoTEs 1131 (1993); Louis M. Kauder, Intercompany
Pricing and Section 482: A Proposal to Shift From Uncontrolled Comparables to Formulary
Apportionment Now, 58 TAx NoTs 485 (1993); Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the
Myth of Arn's Length, 30 TAX NoTEs 625 (1986); Stanley I. Langbein, A Modified Fractional
Apportionment Proposal for Tax Transfer Pricing, 54 TAx NoTEs 719 (1992).
77. The traditional arm's length standard does not work because it ignores the economic
reality of the interdependence and integration of the business operations of multinational
enterprises and because, in many transfer pricing situations, there are no comparable uncontrolled
transactions on which to base a theoretically correct ann's length price. The decline in the
viability of the traditional arm's length standard is likely to intensify in the future as a greater
proportion of global trade involves high technology goods for which no market analogues exist.
See Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length, supra note 75, at 152.
78. In a U.S. international tax system of the type that I favor, based on capital export
neutrality, and which uses a foreign tax credit as the primary device for mitigating international
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U.S. tax authorities have invested significant resources in successfully
developing an international consensus in favor of establishing the arm's
length standard as the international norm for transfer pricing. Therefore,
they are not likely to explicitly abandon that standard anytime soon.
They sincerely believe that the arm's length standard, at least in a broad
sense, is theoretically correct and are justifiably concerned that such
abandonment would undermine the United States' credibility in the
international tax community. Instead, the movement of the United
States toward greater use of formulary apportionment is an evolutionary
process. It is a process evidenced by the gradual weakening of the tradi-
tional arm's length standard in the regulations, which rely much less on
comparables and focus more on achieving arm's length results, and
which adopt profit split methodology where functions are highly interre-
lated and cannot readily be evaluated on a separate basis.79 The IRS's
use of global apportionment in the context of Advance Pricing Agree-
ments involving global trading of commodities and derivative financial
products also evidences this process.8 0
For formulary apportionment to become a realistic alternative to the
arm's length standard, much work has to be done on a multilateral basis.
The United States and its major trading partners must agree on the
appropriateness of formulary apportionment and on design issues relat-
ing to the formulary method, including, most importantly, when the
method would apply and what elements would be used in the formulae
for different types of businesses. 81 Unless we achieve international con-
sensus, adoption of formulary apportionment on a unilateral basis by the
United States would undermine our tax treaty program and distort the
worldwide allocation of investment capital by overtaxing some taxpay-
ers and undertaxing others. Consensus on these issues is unlikely to
occur anytime soon, even if the United States develops its own proposal
for formulary apportionment. 82 Consequently, the United States and its
double taxation, one could make greater use of apportionment methodology for determining the
source of income from U.S. multinationals' international transactions for foreign tax credit and
anti-deferral purposes. This would substantially reduce the role of the separate transaction, arm's
length approach to transfer pricing and the complex source-of-income and allocation-and-
apportionment-of-deduction rules of current law. See generally Asim Bhansali, Note, supra note
14.
79. See generally Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length, supra note 75, at 140-47.
80. See I.R.S. Notice 94-40, 1994-1 C.B. 351, 352.
81. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: PROBLEMS
PERSIST IN DETERMINING TAX EFFECTS OF INTERCOMPANY PRICES 724 (1992); Joann M. Weiner,
Using the Experience in the U.S. States to Evaluate Issues in Implementing Formula
Apportionment at the International Level, 13 TAX NOTES INT'L 2113 (1996).
82. Moreover, as a practical matter, much more analysis of the likely effect of adoption of
formulary apportionment on U.S. tax revenues and on the costs of administration and compliance
for taxpayers and the government would be necessary before the United States would likely
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trading partners have little choice but to continue taking steps to make
the modified arm's length standard more workable in practice.
B. Self-Assessment in the Transfer Pricing System
Historically, the government's enforcement of the arm's length
method has not eliminated the opportunities for transfer pricing abuse.
It has only led to time-consuming and costly audits and litigation dis-
putes that have placed a major strain on the tax system. In an era of
declining resources for the IRS, it will not be possible for the govern-
ment to expand its traditional methods of dispute resolution in the trans-
fer pricing area (i.e., audits and litigation) to the level that would be
necessary to significantly improve enforcement of the arm's length stan-
dard through traditional techniques. Accordingly, during recent years,
the United States has increasingly moved in the transfer pricing area
toward what amounts to a self-assessment transfer pricing system, in the
form of more extensive documentation requirements and stringent penal-
ties under section 6662(e).8 3 This is a necessary development if the cur-
rent transfer pricing rules are going to be more successful in preventing
international tax avoidance and preserving the U.S. tax base for both
outbound and inbound international transactions. However, unless some
international consensus on these documentation requirements is reached,
multinational enterprises are justifiably concerned that they will face the
burden of complying with a different set of documentation requirements
in each country in which they do business. Accordingly, the United
States must work through the OECD to develop an international consen-
sus on the use and nature of such documentation requirements.8 4
In addition, one of the most promising developments in recent
years in the U.S. tax system has been the increasing use of non-litiga-
tion, alternative dispute resolution techniques, particularly in the transfer
pricing area. The much heralded Advance Pricing Agreement ("APA")
is an important device for resolving transfer pricing questions in advance
of litigation. This technique should be expanded to the extent that
declining IRS resources permit. Greater use of multilateral APAs
should increase the level of international tax compliance and help elimi-
nate international double taxation." However, the APA process is a
undertake any serious work toward developing an international consensus in favor of greater use
of formulary apportionment.
83. See I.R.C. § 6662(e) (1996).
84. See, e.g., Joseph H. Guttentag, Remarks at George Washington University/IRS Annual
Institute on International Taxation (Dec. 12, 1996), in TAx ANALYSTS' DAILY TAX HIGHLIGHTS &
DocumENrs, Dec. 16, 1996 at 2828.
85. John Lyons, the U.S. competent authority, has stated that about 80 percent of all APA
agreements in the U.S. inventory are multilateral APAs. See id. at 2830.
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time and resource consuming process. It is important that the results of
that process be better utilized to provide guidance to the large number of
taxpayers who are unable to afford an APA. Accordingly, the IRS
should abandon its position that APAs are exempt from Freedom of
Information Act disclosure and should begin publishing APAs in
redacted form with all taxpayer-identifying and proprietary information
deleted. 6
C. Effect of Repealing Deferral and Reforming Foreign Tax
Credit Limit
Making the current transfer pricing rules more workable depends,
in part, on the status of reforms in other areas of the U.S. international
tax system. Enacting my proposals outlined above for repealing deferral
for U.S. shareholders of CFCs and reform of the foreign tax credit limit
would, probably substantially, reduce the number of outbound transfer
pricing controversies arising under section 482. Since a CFC's income
would be currently taxed to its U.S. parent corporation, there would be
much less incentive for the U.S. parent to engage in abusive transfer
pricing practices. This is particularly true if, under a tightened general
income basket limit, the U.S. parent would have reduced cross-crediting
opportunities with respect to high-taxed and low-taxed foreign business
income.
VII. REPEAL EXPORT INCENTIVES IN THE CODE
A. Repeal FSC Provisions
The FSC provisions are export subsidies that are administered
through the tax system.8 7 These provisions violate horizontal and verti-
cal equity by reducing or eliminating the U.S. tax on a particular type of
economic income and thereby interfere with an appropriate allocation of
the tax burden based on the taxpayers' relative abilities to pay taxes.
These provisions distort the economic behavior of U.S. taxpayers in vio-
lation of capital export neutrality because they serve as a disincentive for
foreign production in situations where non-tax considerations would dic-
86. The IRS's refusal to publish the APAs after they have been issued has led some
commentators to describe the APA process as "[t]axation by secret negotiation and agreement,"
which is inconsistent with democratic ideals and undercuts the appearance of integrity and even-
handedness that is essential to a tax system that relies heavily on self-assessment. See Dale W.
Wickham & Charles J. Kerester, New Directions Needed for Solution of the International Transfer
Pricing Tax Puzzle: Internationally Agreed Rules or Tax Warfare?, 56 TAX NoTES 339, 354
(1992).
87. For example, Gary Hufbauer has estimated that "the FSC export incentive may have
boosted the value of US exports by between $4.4 billion and $6.6 billion in 1990." HUFBAUER,
supra note 11, at 126.
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tate a foreign location for such production. They also add tremendous
complexity to the tax system by adding a number of complicated Code
sections and many pages of regulations with detailed requirements for
implementing this tax subsidy. Moreover, because they represent an
export subsidy that attempts to distort international trade flows, the FSC
provisions violate the spirit (although arguably not the letter) of our obli-
gations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Furthermore, the provisions are an ineffective trade subsidy that
arguably have, at best, a minimal effect on improving U.S. trade bal-
ances. In a world of floating exchange rates, any stimulation in exports
resulting from the FSC provisions is offset over time by a stimulation of
imports caused by adjustments in the exchange rate for the U.S. dollar
which make imported goods cheaper for U.S. customers to purchase.88
Therefore, these provisions do not effectively achieve the purposes for
which they were established. Any serious effort at international tax
reform should include repeal of this wasteful tax subsidy. 9
Another collateral benefit of repealing these provisions is that it
would send a message that Congress is serious about reducing the role of
the tax system in channelling economic behavior into favored types of
economic endeavors. By contrast, retention of these provisions, in
response to special pleading by U.S. exporters, would make it difficult
for Congress to eliminate tax subsidies that favor other industries, such
as the various tax incentive provisions in the natural resource area. This
would make a serious base broadening effort in other areas of the Code
more difficult.
88. See, e.g., McIntyre, Collecting Current Tax, supra note 41, at 445; see also Shay, supra
note 14, at 1061.
89. One argument advanced in favor of the FSC provisions, and the predecessor DISC
provisions, is that U.S. exporters are disadvantaged relative to U.S. taxpayers that can locate their
production facilities abroad in low-tax foreign jurisdictions and obtain the benefits of deferral;
thus, a bias in the tax system exists in favor of moving production facilities abroad. The FSC and
DISC provisions are intended in part to offset this bias. Thus, if, as proposed in this paper,
deferral is completely repealed for U.S. shareholders of CFCs, the FSC provisions would no
longer be needed as a counterweight to deferral and could be repealed. Shay, supra note 14, at
1061.
Critics of immediate repeal of the FSC provisions argue that unilateral repeal of the FSC
provisions by the United States, while other exporting countries continue to provide tax-favored
treatment of export income, would amount to self-destructive unilateral trade disarmament. For
example, Gary Hufbauer proposes that U.S. repeal of the FSC provisions be implemented on a
selective basis as the United States reaches bilateral or multilateral agreement on harmonized
treatment of export earnings. HUFBAUER, supra note 11, at 147. However, the validity of this
argument depends on the effectiveness of the FSC provisions in increasing U.S. exports, a matter
on which there is a wide divergence of opinion.
[Vol. 51:9751006
PROGRESSIVE REFORM
B. Modify Inventory Sales Source Rule
One of the important international tax reforms effected by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 was the adoption of section 865, which sources gain
from the sale of personal property to the residence of the seller, subject
to a number of exceptions. A major exception was made, however, for
sales of inventory property by U.S. exporters, for which the title-passage
rule was retained. Congress retained the title-passage rule, in large part,
as a tax subsidy for such exporters. In the case of an exporter who
manufactures the property in the United States and sells the property to a
foreign customer, regulations issued in 1996 arbitrarily allocate 50 per-
cent of the gain from the sale of the manufactured property to the sales
function. If title to the property is passed to the foreign customer
abroad, that fifty percent sales portion of the income will be treated as
foreign source income.90 The exporter may elect to use an independent
factory or production price to determine the amount of sales income if
such a price is available.91
This foreign source sales income is unlikely to bear any foreign
income tax; therefore, the result of the title-passage source rule is to
create untaxed, foreign source, general limit income that can absorb high
foreign taxes imposed on the U.S. exporter's other foreign source, gen-
eral limit income. These rules undercut the proper functioning of the
foreign tax credit limit and allow a taxpayer to use cross-crediting to
reduce its U.S. tax liability. These rules distort economic behavior by
favoring export sales over domestic sales. They use a test for determin-
ing the source of the export sales income (title passage), which has little
or no nexus to the economic activities giving rise to the income.
Congress should repeal the title-passage rule for gain from inven-
tory sales in sections 865(b), 861(a)(6), and 862(a)(6), and treat gain
from inventory sales of U.S. sellers as U.S. source income under the
residence-of-the-seller source rule in section 865(a). An exception to
the residence-of-the-seller rule should be made in the case of a U.S.
seller that has an office or fixed place of business in a foreign country to
which the inventory sale is attributable (i.e., the foreign office materially
participated in the sale). In this case, the sales portion of the income
should be foreign source income. This exception should not apply if the
property is sold for use, disposition, or consumption in the United
States, in which case the gain from the inventory sale should be entirely
U.S. source income. Moreover, any income from an inventory sale to an
affiliate of the U.S. exporter should be treated as U.S. source income
90. See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b)(1) (1996).
91. See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b)(2) (1996).
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under the residence-of-the-seller rule. In the case of an exporter who
manufactures and sells the inventory, the income from the sale should be
allocated between the production and sales functions based on a formula
that more accurately reflects the production portion of the income,
unless the taxpayer properly establishes an independent factory or pro-
duction price and elects to use that method. In the usual case, the 50/50
formula in the current regulations probably overallocates income to the
sale function.
VIII. REPEAL FOREIGN EARNED INCOME EXCLUSION
Section 911 is an example of a tax preference provision in the U.S.
international tax system that distorts economic behavior in violation of
capital export neutrality, undermines the fairness of the tax system, and
adds considerable complexity to the system.92 It should be repealed.
A more appropriate way to tax U.S. citizens and resident aliens
living and working abroad is to include all of their income in the U.S.
tax base, but allow a foreign tax credit for foreign income taxes paid on
their foreign source income. That division of the tax base fairly recog-
nizes the primary right of the foreign country where a U.S. citizen or
resident alien resides to impose a tax on that taxpayer's income from
sources within that country, but also preserves the United States'
residual right to tax its U.S. citizens and resident aliens.
There are three basic arguments in favor of repeal of section 911.
First, the provision distorts economic and social behavior by encourag-
ing U.S. citizen and resident alien employees to choose their place of
residence and work based upon tax considerations. It distorts interna-
tional labor flows by encouraging mobile U.S. workers to relocate to
low-tax foreign jurisdictions and reduce their worldwide income tax bur-
den. It also distorts the location of U.S. business operations abroad
because, to the extent that the exemption allows U.S. employers to
reduce salaries of U.S. workers living abroad, it subsidizes the U.S.
employer, rather than the employee (who obtains the same amount of
after-tax salary income). This causes a diversion of business operations
by U.S. employers to the low-tax foreign jurisdictions in violation of
capital export neutrality.
Second, using ability-to-pay principles, the provision violates tradi-
92. See generally GuSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 4, at 308-09; 1 Joel D. Kuntz &
Robert J. Peroni, U.S. International Taxation I B 1.04[l] (1992); Charles I. Kingson, A Somewhat
Different View, 34 TAX LAW. 737 (1981); Philip F. Postlewaite & Gregory E. Stem, Innocents
Abroad? The 1978 Foreign Earned Income Act and the Case for its Repeal, 65 VA. L. REv. 1093
(1979); Renee Judith Sobel, United States Taxation of its Citizens Abroad: Incentive or Equity, 38
VAND. L. Rnv. 101 (1985). But see John D. Maiers, The Foreign Earned Income Exclusion:
Reinventing the Wheel, 34 TAX LAW. 691 (1981).
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tional horizontal and vertical equity principles by providing a lower tax
burden for those U.S. individuals living and working abroad than for
U.S. individuals with the same amount of compensation income who
live and work in the United States. Alternatively, using benefits princi-
ples of taxation, the provision violates fairness by allowing U.S. citizens
and permanent resident aliens to retain the benefits of their citizenship or
resident alien status without paying their fair share of the costs of pro-
viding those benefits. The underlying assumption of this argument is
that U.S. citizenship or resident alien status confers substantial benefits
on the citizen or resident alien wherever they live. They receive the
collective benefits accorded from U.S. government expenditures for
national defense, foreign affairs and foreign aid, and general government
expenditures. Another significant value of U.S. citizenship is the ability
to return to the United States without limitation and enjoy the legal,
economic, and social institutions of this country. Exemption of U.S.
citizens' and resident aliens' foreign source income from U.S. tax allows
them to be "free riders" with respect to these benefits provided by the
U.S. government.93
Finally, section 911 adds complexity to the tax system. To take
advantage of the provision, a taxpayer must meet a series of fact-ori-
ented tests to establish his or her status as a "qualified individual:"
determine the amount of earned income from foreign sources; apply the
$70,000-per-year limit (prorated for the number of qualifying days dur-
ing the year); determine the amount of housing cost; avoid various other
restrictions on the exclusion; and properly make the exclusion elections.
Since most countries do not impose tax on the foreign source
income of their nonresident citizens, it could be argued that the United
States should not assert residence-based taxing jurisdiction over the for-
eign source income of U.S. citizens and resident aliens who are living
and working abroad. This argument rests on the notion that the political
allegiance to the United States that citizenship or legal immigration sta-
tus confers is not a sufficiently strong nexus to justify the imposition of
a U.S. income tax (without actual U.S. residence). This argument fur-
ther assumes that nonresident U.S. citizens or legal aliens receive suffi-
ciently fewer U.S. government benefits than those received by resident
U.S. citizens and legal aliens to justify an exemption from U.S. tax on
their foreign source income. However, that argument supports a com-
plete U.S. tax exemption for all foreign source income realized by U.S.
citizens and resident aliens living abroad, not a limited exemption for
foreign earned income, plus certain housing costs. Accordingly, under
93. See, e.g., Pamela B. Gann, The Concept of an Independent Treaty Foreign Tax Credit, 38
TAX L. REv. 1, 62-66 (1982).
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this view, section 911 does not go far enough and should be replaced
with a provision exempting the foreign source income of U.S. citizens
and resident aliens living abroad. An expanded section 911 exclusion,
however, would be difficult to administer and would require a careful
formulation of the tests for "qualified individual" status to prevent abuse
of the exclusion.
IX. REEVALUATE THE USE OF TAx PROVISIONS AS A
PENALTY MECHANISM
A number of international tax provisions were enacted to penalize
certain behavior viewed by Congress as inconsistent with various for-
eign policy or international trade policy objectives (e.g., the anti-boycott
provisions in sections 908 and 952(a)(3)). Like their statutory siblings,
the tax expenditure provisions, these provisions complicate the tax sys-
tem and place the wrong governmental agency, the IRS, in charge of
administering the penalty regime. 4 Although I generally favor direct
sanctions, rather than tax penalty provisions, as the means for imple-
menting the international trade or foreign policy goals of the United
States, I do not propose repealing all of these provisions. Instead, in
connection with reform of the international tax rules, a careful study of
these provisions is warranted. Such provisions should be retained on a
provision-by-provision basis only if the advantages of using a tax pen-
alty provision over direct sanctions is clearly demonstrated. That is, in
my view, the presumption should be against using tax penalty provisions
as a means of achieving non-tax foreign policy or trade policy
objectives.
X. CONCLUSION
As we approach the twenty-first century, it is time to get serious
about income tax reform and simplification. Before abandoning an
income tax system that is the envy of the world, we should try to reform
that system into a more broad-based system with lower, overall rates.
Let's start this reform effort with the U.S. international tax rules and
seek to build a U.S. international tax system that more fully reflects
capital export neutrality principles and a residence-based system of tax-
ing the international income of U.S. persons. Specifically, we should
repeal deferral for U.S. shareholders of CFCs and consolidate the other
anti-deferral regimes into a revised PFIC regime; reform and simplify
the foreign tax credit provisions; repeal the FSC provisions and the title-
94. For a policy critique of tax penalty provisions generally, see Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence Via
Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. Rav. 343 (1989).
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passage rule for export sales; and repeal the foreign earned income
exclusion. In other words, let's return to the progressive agenda of ear-
lier international tax reform efforts, including the tax reform movements
that resulted in the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1962 and the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, which were aimed at improving the equity and
efficiency of the U.S. international income tax rules.
